1954 Suez Canal Agreement

Nationalization surprised Britain and its Commonwealth. There was no discussion on the channel at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers` Conference in London in late June and early July. [120]:7-8 Egypt`s actions, however, threatened Britain`s economic and military interests in the region. Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement of 1938. As the US government did not support the British protests, the British government opted for military intervention against Egypt in order to prevent the complete collapse of British prestige in the region. [121] British troops must be withdrawn from the Canal Zone within 20 months of signing the agreement. We have agreed with the Egyptians on satisfactory arrangements for the withdrawal of our forces and the handing over of facilities to contractors. 105 The Hashemite dynasty now governs Iraq and Jordan; He ruled the Hejaz, his ancestral homeland, from where he was ousted in 1925 by the Saudis, who incorporated the Hejaz into their domain in 1926. In 1932, King Ibn Saud changed the name of his kingdom from the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd to Saudi Arabia, the “Arabia of The Sand”. See Sanger, R. H., The Arabian Peninsula 32–34 (Ithaca, 1954). The reaction of President Dwight Eisenhower`s administration has been muted. He warned the Soviets that recklessly talking about a nuclear conflict would only aggravate the situation and warned Khrushchev not to intervene directly in the conflict.

However, Eisenhower (1890-1969) also strongly warned the French, British and Israeli to abandon their campaign and withdraw from Egyptian soil. Eisenhower was angry with the British, especially because they did not keep the United States informed of their intentions. The United States threatened all three countries with economic sanctions if they persisted in their attack. Threats have done their job. British and French forces withdrew in December; Israel finally yielded to American pressure in March 1957 and ceded control of the canal to Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 ended the presence of British forces along the Suez Canal until June 1956. The trigger for the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1956. The situation had been simmering for some time. Two years earlier, after World War II, the Egyptian army had begun pressuring the British to end their military presence (granted in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936) in the Canal Zone. Nasser`s forces have also engaged in sporadic fighting with Israeli soldiers along the border between the two countries, and the Egyptian leader has done nothing to hide his dislike for the Zionist nation.

Egyptian sovereignty and ownership of the canal have been confirmed by the United States and the United Nations. [Citation needed] Retired Anthony Eden, then Britain`s prime minister, claimed that the military response had prevented a much wider war in the Middle East. In connection with the massive rearmament of Egypt via Czechoslovakia, Israel expected an Egyptian invasion in March or April 1957, as well as a Soviet invasion of Syria. [357] The crisis may also have accelerated decolonization, as many of the remaining British and French colonies gained independence in the coming years. Some have argued that the imposed end of the crisis has led to a precipitous decolonization in Africa, increasing the likelihood of civil wars and military dictatorships in newly independent countries. [358] 43 See Mohammed Neguib (Muhammad Nagīb), Egypt`s Destiny (London, 1955). General Nagīb`a`s resignation as President of Egypt was accepted in early November 1954. Franco-American relations have never recovered from the Suez crisis. [391] There are several reasons for this.

Previously, there had already been tensions in Franco-American relations, triggered by what Paris saw as a betrayal by the United States of the French war effort in Indochina near Dien Bien Phu in 1954. [391] The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. Mollet felt that Eden should have postponed the convening of the cabinet until November 7, in the meantime take the full channel and then veto any UN sanctions resolution with the Frenchman. From General de Gaulle`s point of view, the events at Suez showed France that it could not rely on its allies; the British had initiated an armistice in the middle of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had fought Paris politically. The damage to relations between Paris and Washington, D.C., “culminated in President de Gaulle`s decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO`s military integration.” [392] The Suez War had an immense impact on French domestic politics […].